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VIEWS OF A FRIENDLY OBSERVER
JOHN MINOR WISDOMt
In 1961 Judge Henry Friendly reviewed Llewellyn's The Com-
mon Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals' for the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review.2 He had been on the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit for not quite two years. Judge Friendly started his review
with this observation:
This is a heartening book for a recently appointed appellate
judge-heartening, that is, after weathering the initial shock
of being told that the bar is not merely "bothered about our
appellate courts," but "is so much bothered about these
courts that we face a crisis in confidence which packs dan-
ger." . . . He wonders for a moment whether it was wise to
abandon the safety and comfort of practice for a post so pre-
carious. But for a moment only. Professor Llewellyn is
happy about appellate courts as they are today.'
Henry Friendly wondered "for a moment only" whether he had
been wise to abandon his law practice because Karl Llewellyn was
"happy about appellate courts as they are today." If Professor Llewel-
lyn were alive today he would be even happier, for he would have been
able to rely on Judge Friendly's opinions as shining proof that "the
courts have returned to Reason-ley est resoun."4 Within my lifetime,
except for the giants (Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo) and possibly
Learned Hand, no federal appellate judge has commanded more respect
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A.B. 1925,
Washington and Lee University; LL.B. 1929, Tulane University.
1 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs (1960).
S See Friendly, Book Review, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1040 (1961).
3 Id.
, Langbridge's Case, Y. B. 19 Edw. III, 375 (Stonore, C.J.), cited in K. LLEWEL-
LYN, supra note 1, at 52 n.46. Judge Friendly explained:
Professor Llewellyn does not mean that the courts have returned to justice;
he is too good a Holmesian to speak in that term, although he excuses the
gallant gentleman's "I hate justice" as springing from and expressing "a
normal appellate judge's revulsion at the too frequent ranting about justice
which hopes to conceal either a weak case or a shoddy preparation."...
Instead, the "justice-duty" of appellate courts is expressed in a felt respon-
sibility to do what is "'fair,' and 'right,' and, to mark the minimum, 'only
decent.'" . . . Or, to make matters entirely clear, "the main guide is felt
sense and decency, the right result on the facts of case and situation (or,
more wisely, on the facts first of the situation-type and only then of the
particular case) . .. ."
Friendly, supra note 2, at 1040-41.
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for his opinions and his writings than Henry Friendly. The striking
feature that distinguishes his opinions is their measured reasoning, with
a minimum of rhetorical flourishes.
I knew Judge Hand only distantly, but I have been engaged in
three joint ventures with Henry Friendly, each covering an extended
period of time. I have served with him on the Council of the American
Law Institute for many years. Then for seven years we were members
of the Institute's Advisory Committee on the Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts.5 Finally, for nine years
I have 'been on the Special Railroad Court over which he presides.'
The Institute has issued Restatements, Model Codes, and studies
covering a wide variety of subjects. Each of these, after having been
drafted by the Reporters and approved by its Advisory Committee, was
subject to scrutiny and approval by the Council before it was submitted
to the Institute. In Council meetings Judge Friendly excelled in the
areas of jurisdiction, administrative law, federal procedure, corporate
law, securities, and conflicts of law. One could predict this of the
youthful author of The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,7 pub-
lished in 1928, and expect it of the seasoned judge, author of Is Inno-
cence Relevant?: Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments,8 Some
Kind of Hearing,9 and Indiscretion About Discretion." But he was
sound and persuasive on any question, large or small, in any area of
the law; no one did his homework better than Henry Friendly on the
subjects that came before the Council.
As the scholarly articles of Judge Pollak and Professor Currie
make clear, Henry Friendly's contributions in the field of federal juris-
diction are outstanding. I well remember my delight in reading In
Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law," for before
and after it was published I had cases involving federal common law.
That article unfuddled more befuddled judges than any law review ar-
ticle I have ever read.
We had a fine Advisory Committee on the Study of the Division of
The Study began in 1961 and was completed in 1968. It was published in 1969.
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BE-
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS x-xii (1969).
8 Established by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C. § 719 (1982).
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483
(1928).
1 Friendly, Is Innocence Relevant?: Collateral Attacks on CriminalJudgnents, 38
U. CM. L. REv. 142 (1970).
1 Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
10 Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L. J. 747 (1982).
" Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 383 (1964).
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Jurisdiction; I had to run my legs off to stay near the pack. It included
Professors Henry M. Hart and Herbert Wechsler (as Director of the
Institute he was an ex officio member). There were other distinguished
lawyers, judges, and teachers.12 Professor Richard H. Field was the
Chief Reporter. Professor Paul J. Mishkin (formerly of the University
of Pennsylvania Law School) was the Reporter on General Diversity
and Multi-Party Multi-State Jurisdiction, assisted by Professor David
L. Shapiro. Professor Charles Alan Wright was the Reporter on Fed-
eral Question Jurisdiction. Judge Friendly had a major hand in the
Study, principally, as I look back on it, in preserving a balanced view
of what historically, constitutionally, and pragmatically is right and
proper for federal courts to decide. The work on the Study began in
1961 and ended in 1968. During that period the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Act of 1965 were adopted; section 1983 filings and
prisoners' petitions increased. But relatively speaking, in those years
the increase in filings was modest. Total filings in the United States
district courts increased only from 86,753 in 1961 to 102,163 in 1968.
There was, therefore, not the pressure to reduce filings by reducing
federal jurisdiction that existed later and almost overwhelms federal
courts today. Total filings for all district courts increased from 102,163
in 1968 to 278,478 in 1983.13 Filings in the courts of appeals increased
sharply from 4204 in 1961 to 9116 in 1968 and to 30,786 in 1983.14
The ALI Study was and is unquestionably extremely valua-
ble-but I think of it as a springboard for Henry Friendly's Federal
Jurisdiction: A General View. 5
12 Those who served on the Advisory Committee were: Judge Oscar H. Davis of
the United States Court of Claims; Judge Edward J. Dimock of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (retired); Judge Henry J.
Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Warner W.
Gardner, Esq., of Washington, D.C.; Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr., of Harvard Law
School; Judge Joseph S. Lord, III, of the United States District Court for Eastern
Pennsylvania; Judge Albert B. Mars of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit (retired); Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey; Justice Arthur E. Whittemore of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts;
and Judge John Minor Wisdom of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. In addition, John G. Buchanan, Esq., of Pittsburgh, Judge Charles M. Mer-
rill of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and Robert L. Stern,
Esq., of Chicago joined the Committee in 1965, while the initial proposals of the Re-
porters were still under consideration. Norris Darrell, Esq., President of the Institute
since 1961, his predecessor Harrison Tweed, Esq., Herbert Wechsler, Esq., Director of
the Institute, and Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, Director of the Institute until his death
in 1962, were members ex officio of the Committee.
13 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL Ju-
DICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 7, 15 (1983) (includes both civil and criminal filings).
14 See id. at 2.
15 H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1973).
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In 1972, only three years after publication of the ALI Study,
Judge Friendly recognized that its basic assumptions were inapplicable
to the existing federal system because a tidal wave of litigation had
engulfed the federal courts. In his independent study, he explained:
The assumption [underlying the ALI Study] was that the
level of business in the federal courts was manageable and
would remain so; the desideratum was to eliminate the most
indefensible portion of the diversity jurisdiction, the suit by
the instate plaintiff against the outstate defendant, and re-
place this with a roughly equivalent volume of cases more
deserving of federal cognizance. Second, the Institute avoided
such areas as suits under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, automobile accident litigation, federal criminal jurisdic-
tion, and the creation of specialized federal courts. In the
third place, criticisms of the Institute's proposals and further
reflection have caused me to change my views in some
respects.
16
This is not the time or place for a book review. I cannot resist the
comment, however, that Judge Friendly's great work has never had the
impact it deserved: it could well serve as a guide for a much-needed
revision of the Judiciary Act. Although there is some disagreement with
the proposal to eliminate diversity jurisdiction, most federal judges I
know feel that diversity jurisdiction has outlived its usefulness and that
state courts are better qualified than federal courts to decide questions
of state law. Judge Friendly would eliminate or greatly reduce the fed-
eral prosecutions for what is not essentially a federal offense, and re-
duce the number of civil cases that might more suitably be tried in state
courts. For example, there is no good, nonpolitical reason for federal
jurisdiction over truth-in-lending cases.
This is Judge Friendly's thesis:
[T]he general federal courts can best serve the country if
their jurisdiction is limited to tasks which are appropriate to
courts [as opposed to administrative agencies], which are best
handled by courts of general rather than specialized jurisdic-
tion, and where the knowledge, tenure and other qualities of
federal judges can make a distinctive contribution."7
I cannot find fault with this thesis or with most of his sugges-
tions-there are many-for modifying present federal jurisdiction,
1 Id. at 4.
17 Id. at 13-14.
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sometimes at the expense of increasing filings. For example, I would go
along with his "maximum model" expanding federal jurisdiction by do-
ing away with any requirement as to amount in a federal question case.
Naturally, there are some suggestions with which I disagree. Having
been exposed to the gross abuse of civil rights that occurred in the
1960's and 1970's in one section of this country, I oppose any extension
of the doctrine of abstention in civil rights cases. I would limit, not
expand, Younger v. Harris."' What has happened once can happen
again and in any section of the country.
As a Friendly observer, I believe that Henry Friendly's most chal-
lenging task, the successful performance of which merits the gratitude
of the nation, has been his stewardship of the Special Railroad Court.
By 1973 the railroads in the northeast and midwest regions of the
country were in such desperate straits that there was no hope for resus-
citation through section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Penn Central, the
major rail carrier in the northeast and midwest, was in a reorganiza-
tion proceeding. By March of 1973, Judge Fullam, supervising the re-
organization, aware that Congress was considering the plight of the
Penn Central and other railroads, warned, "On the basis of the record
to date, it appears highly doubtful that the Debtor could properly be
permitted to continue to operate on its present basis beyond October 1,
1973." 1 There were many reasons for the decline of railroading: the
facilities were old, often poorly located, physically rundown; the rapid
rate of technological development in rival forms of transportation had
radically changed the competitive position of the rail industry; basic
changes had taken place in the underlying market conditions, such as
shifts in the location of industrial activity and changes in types of
freight suitable for rail transportation. 0 Congress came to the rescue by
enacting the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973." The Act cre-
ated the United States Railway Association (USRA) and Consolidated
Rail Corporation (Conrail). USRA was vested with authority to pre-
pare a "Final System Plan" (FSP) for reorganizing rail service in the
northeast and midwest and, according to that plan, determine the rail
properties to be transferred to Conrail by the bankrupt carriers, those
to be sold, and those to be abandoned.22 Conrail, as a private but gov-
Is 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
19 In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
20 See United States Ry. Ass'n, Final System Plan, July 26, 1975, at 1-2.
21 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-793 (Supp. IV 1974) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-
797(m) (1982)).
12 Besides the Penn Central, the railroads in the consolidated proceedings were
the Erie Lackawanna, Lehigh Valley, Reading, Central of New Jersey, Lehigh and
Hudson, and Ann Arbor.
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ernment-supported organization, would operate rail service on the
tranferred properties and was to issue securities to the estates of the
bankrupt railroads in exchange for their properties.
The Act required the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to consoli-
date in a Special Court all proceedings with respect to the Final System
Plan, and directed the Panel to select the members of the Special
Court.2" I had been a member of the Panel since its inception in 1968
and was its Chief Judge at the time the Rail Act was enacted. The
name that came immediately to my mind as the best possible presiding
judge for the Special Court was Henry Friendly's. I telephoned him
promptly. Everyone who knows him well knows that he is extremely
conscientious and has a sensitive regard for duty and for the responsi-
bilities incident to undertaking any important endeavor. He hesitated,
asked for time to think about it, then called me back to say that he
would do it. I think that he was principally influenced by the thought
that the rail consolidation, as contemplated in the Act, offered the last
opportunity to avoid nationalization of railroads in the Northeast Cor-
ridor. He felt a sense of duty to the country (he must have realized his
special qualifications) but he was concerned about his responsibilities as
a judge on what many consider the second most important appellate
court in the country. And he was interested in a number of extracurric-
ular activities, among them ongoing projects of the ALI. He solved his
dilemma only partly by taking senior status, for he continues to sit on
the court of appeals and he is still active in the ALI.
Henry and I then agreed that Judge Carl McGowan, who had
served as general counsel for a railroad when he was practicing law,
would be an excellent choice for the Special Railroad Court. Judge
McGowan contributed notably to the important opinion on the consti-
tutionality of the Act, but resigned after serving almost two years. I
succeeded him in 1975. In effect, I appointed myself; I wanted the
pleasure and learning experience of sitting with Judge Friendly.
For the third judge we agreed that we needed an experienced dis-
trict judge living in or near Washington, D.C., our headquarters. We
made no mistake in selecting Roszel C. Thomsen of Baltimore. He was
exceptionally valuable in every respect, but particularly in resolving
disputes over discovery, within the necessity of our convening a full
court for a hearing. Incidentally, the average age of the judges on the
court is over eighty-one, making us, I am sure, the oldest multi-judge
court in the English-speaking world. By comparison, the United States
Supreme Court is a youthful court.
23 45 U.S.C. § 719(b) (1982).
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As Judge McGowan notes in his tribute in this issue of the Law
Review, the first important problems before the court concerned the
constitutionality of the Act. Specifically, certain creditors of the bank-
rupt railroads argued that the Act violated the fifth amendment on two
grounds: (1) .the requirement that rail properties be conveyed to Con-
rail in exchange for its securities rather than for cash amounted to an
unjust taking of property without adequate compensation; and (2) the
requirement that rail service be maintained until adoption of the Final
System Plan without compensating for the erosion of rail properties
during this period was an unconstitutional taking of property (this was
later termed "compensable unconstitutional erosion," or CUE). Reor-
ganization courts had divided on the subject of the constitutionality of
the Act.24 The Special Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act,
basing that conclusion "in considerable measure" on the railroads' right
to assert a claim for any shortfall or CUE in the Court of Claims
under the Tucker Act.2 5 That opinion set the pattern for later block-
busters: each of the three judges wrote a part, but participated in the
opinion as a whole; Judge Friendly took over the most difficult topics
and wrote more of the opinion than his colleagues; the opinion was
long (a hundred printed pages). When the case reached the Supreme
Court Justice Brennan, writing for a seven-to-two Court, wrote:
The Special Court, speaking through Judge Friendly, com-
prehensively canvassed both issues, and in a thorough opin-
ion, concluded that the Rail Act does not bar any necessary
resort to the Tucker Act remedy and that the remedy is ade-
quate. Our independent examination of the issues brings us
to the same conclusion, substantially for the reasons stated by
Judge Friendly in Parts VII and VIII-A of the Special
Court opinion."
The Special Court is authorized to exercise the powers of a district
24 Two reorganization courts concluded that the Act was "fair and equitable." In
re Reading Co., 378 F. Supp. 481, 484(E.D. Pa. 1974); In re Ann Arbor R.R., No.
74-90833 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 1974). Three reorganization courts found that the Act
does not provide a process that is fair and equitable to the estates of the railroads. In re
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 382 F. Supp. 856, 870 (E.D. Pa. 1974); In re Lehigh Valley
R.R., 382 F. Supp. 854, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1974); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co. (Second-
ary Debtors), 382 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1974); In re Central R.R., No. B.401-67
(D.N.J. June 28, 1974); In re Lehigh & H.R. Ry., 377 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). The Special Court established under § 209(b), on September 30, 1974, reversed
the orders in those cases and directed reorganization under the Rail Act. In re Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 954-55 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1974).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982); see In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895,
952-54 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1974).
21 Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 121 (1974).
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judge, including those of a reorganization court,27 and has "original
and exclusive jurisdiction" in any civil action challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Act or the legality of any action or inaction of USRA.'*
A final order or judgment of the court is reviewable only upon petition
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, except that any order or
judgment determining the unconstitutionality or invalidity of the Act or
action taken under the Act is reviewable by direct appeal to the Su-
preme Court.
29
This grant of jurisdiction enabled the court to decide an assort-
ment of actions involving USRA, Conrail, and railroads in the consoli-
dated proceeding. Many of these were important but did not bear on
the difficult problem of valuation of the properties conveyed. This
problem was, of course, triggered by the conveyance of the rail proper-
ties, designated in the Final System Plan, to Conrail on April 1, 1976.
Life was not made easier for us by the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976.0 This omnibus legislation incorpo-
rated regulatory reform and a program of aid for railroads outside the
northeast region, but also extensively amended the 1973 Act to improve
the effectiveness of the Final System Plan. The added complexities
arose in large part from an amendment creating a new form of security,
"certificates of value" (CV's), as part of the consideration payable to
the railroads for their transfer of property to Conrail. These CV's, to
be redeemed by USRA not later than December 31, 1987, constitute
general obligations of the United States, and carry the pledge of its full
27 45 U.S.C. § 719(b) (1982).
2- 45 U.S.C. § 719(e)(1) (1982) provides:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any civil action-
(A) for injunctive or other relief against the Association from the en-
forcement, operation, or execution of this chapter or any provision thereof,
or from any action taken by the Association pursuant to authority con-
ferred or purportedly conferred under this chapter;
(B) challenging the constitutionality of this chapter or any provision
thereof;
(C) challenging the legality of any action of the Association, or any
failure of the Association to take any action, pursuant to authority con-
ferred or purportedly conferred under this chapter;
(D) to obtain, inspect, copy, or review any document in the possession
or control of the Association that would be discoverable in litigation pur-
suant to section 743(c) of this title;
(E) brought after a conveyance, pursuant to section 743(b) of this
title, to set aside or annul such conveyance or to secure in any way the
reconveyance of any rail properties so conveyed; or
(F) with respect to continuing reorganization and supplemental
transactions, in accordance with section 745 of this title; shall be within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the special court.
29 45 U.S.C. § 719(e)(3) (1982).
30 45 U.S.C. §§ 801-855 (1982).
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faith and credit. A separate series of CV's is issued to each transferor.
From the opening gun, of course, the attorneys for the various
parties, an exceptionally able group, had been preparing their cases.
The Court, after numerous conferences with the Liaison Committee
representing the parties, issued a comprehensive memorandum order in
In re Valuation Proceedings Under Sections 303(e) and 306 of the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act. 1 This order sharpened the issues
on valuation and provided a schedule for the submission of statements,
reports, briefs, and affidavits or offers of proof on spelled-out issues. At
that time, June 16, 1976, we contemplated the use of as many as ten
special masters to take detailed evidence and for whom we could frame
appropriate instructions based on our identification of the issues and
the parties' statements of position. Later we decided not to use masters,
but the memorandum order of June 16, 1976, and our opinion that
followed 2 helped narrow the issues in the case.
In particular, the court decided, among other things, that in valu-
ing the properties the "fair and equitable" standard should not be dis-
tinguished from the "constitutional minimum value" (CMV) standard,
in the absence of a specific and supported claim that a different result
would ensue from application of such a standard.33 As stated in this
order of the June 16, 1976:
Critical to ascertainment of the redemption price is our de-
termination, § 306(c)(4), of the "base value" (BV) of each
series. This is computed by determining the "net liquidation
value" (NLV), to which the transferor may be entitled by
virtue of transfer of property to Conrail, subtracting the
value of other benefits provided under the Act (VOB), ad-
ding compensable unconstitutional erosion (CUE), and fi-
naly adding interest compounded annually at the rate of 8%
per annum,. . . The formula, omitting the interest item and
the final division, thus is:
BV = NLV- VOB + CUE
A principal problem is that this new concept was superim-
posed on the concepts of "public interest," "fair and equita-
ble," and "constitutional minimum" in § 303(c) without any
clear indication in the statute itself, as distinguished from the
legislative history, what Congress considered was the rela-
31 425 F. Supp. 266, 276 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1976).
32 In re Valuation Proceedings Under Sections 303(e) and 306 of the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act, 425 F. Supp. 266.
33 Id. at 270.
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tionship of the securities issuable to the transferors as pre-
scribed by § 306 and the standards laid down in § 303.34
The order also stated:
It is clear that, under § 306(c)(4), the Court is bound to
determine the net liquidation value to which the transferors
are entitled by virtue of transfers of rail properties to Con-
Rail under § 303(b)(1) as a step in determining the BV of
the CV's, whether the value of the securities (including the
CV's) issuable to the transferors is the same as or more or
less than the constitutional minimum value (CMV). The
statements, however, reveal serious differences of opinion
how this task should be performed."
In short, we faced no easy problem."
In 1977 Judge Friendly was the principal author of two important
decisions in In re Valuation Procedings. These are vintage Friendly
" Id. at 276-77 (footnote omitted).
8 Id. at 281.




(1) "Public interest"; "fair and equitable"; reorganization vs. eminent do-
main statute, reckless or deliberate disregard clause, § 209(a)(1)-see Part
II, Items (1), (2), (3) and (4); relevance of possibility of sale for rail use to
public bodies having power of condemnation, see Part III.
Opening briefs-August 23
Answering briefs-September 21
(2) Method of handling the valuation of properties not owned by primary
debtors, see Part II, Item (5).
Opening briefs-August 23
Answering briefs-September 21
(3) Report by Acting Liaison Committee with respect to first stage discov-
ery on NLV methodology and on efforts by USRA and transferors to ef-
fect sales for rail use to private parties.
August 23
(4) Date on which USRA shall file detailed statement of value of other
benefits.
December 1
(5) Filing by transferors of statements and briefs with respect to compen-
sable unconstitutional erosion: October 18
Response by Government parties: November 15
Replies: December 7








opinions. The first, the CUE Opinion, set out guidelines with respect to
the accrual of "compensable unconstitutional erosion" to be included in
the base value of the CV's.17 This involved what the Supreme Court
called an "erosion taking" of property of the transferors for which the
fifth amendment would require just compensaton.3 8 Unconstitutional
erosion arises when a losing business has been required to continue to
operate against its will for more than a reasonable period. Penn Cen-
tral's claim for preconveyance erosion ran to nearly $900 million. Sub-
ject to certain caveats, no railroad suffered preconveyance CUE.
The second opinion, the CMV Opinion, of October 12, 1977, dealt
with "compensable minimum value," net liquidation value (NLV), and
the value of other benefits (VOB).39 This opinion established that the
transferors are entitled to compensation for the properties under the
FSP for whatever they could have realized in the absence of the Rail
Act. That was the ultimate issue in In re Valuation. The Court held
that even as to nonbankrupt transferors, the Act is a valid reorganiza-
tion statute and payment may be made in CV's with cash payable only
for any shortfall; that in determining NLV, liquidation for scrap was
not the only liquidation Congress contemplated; that potential sales to
government bodies could be considered; that consideration of the taker
for purpose of determining CMV, by attempting to reconstruct a bar-
gaining process between the transferors and the United States, would
be inconsistent with the basic principle of eminent domain; and that, in
the interest of avoiding the expense incident to complex engineering
studies, the court would not consider estimates of reproduction costs or
variations on that theme such as "assemblage values," value of materi-
als "in the place," trended original costs, gross liquidation value, or
societal value.
The third blockbuster in the Valuation Proceedings was the Rail
Use Opinion in 1981, an opinion of 200 printed pages; the table of
contents in fine print took up one page."0 Penn Central, representing
eighty percent of the case in terms of property value, had settled with
the government for $1.46 billion.41 Other transferors followed suit,
leaving only the Erie Lackawanna, Central Railroad of New Jersey,
" In re Valuation Proceedings Under §§ 303(c) and 306 of the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973, 439 F. Supp. 1351 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1977).
" Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 118 (1974).
39 In re Valuation Proceedings Under §§ 303(c) and 306 of the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973, 445 F. Supp. 994 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1977).
40 In re Valuation Proceedings Under §§ 303(c) and 306 of the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973, 531 F. Supp. 1191 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1981).
41 With interest from the conveyance date, April 1, 1976, the total amount was
$2.1 billion.
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Ann Arbor, and Lehigh at New England as the transferors with claims
still at issue. After the opinion had been substantially completed the
Erie Lackawanna agreed to a tentative settlement. Nevertheless, the
court decided to publish the opinion before approval of that settlement
for various reasons but chiefly because we thought that justice required
that the nonsettling railroads be advised of our conclusions as soon as
we were ready to announce them. The settlements complicated the case
for the transferors in the preparation of their briefs because the Penn
Central had taken the lead role for the transferors. The government
parties' opening brief was in nine volumes, totaling 5000 pages, not
counting a thirty-two volume appendix. The transferors submitted
twelve volumes of brief and a fifty-two volume appendix.
The opinion is so long and dealt with so many topics it cannot be
adequately summarized here. Simplistically stated, it dealt in the main
with the valuation of railroads or segments of railroads that had estab-
lished earning power and would be continued in rail use on that ac-
count. This required consideration in depth of the position of each
party, the bargaining process for properties having earnings value, the
effect of inflation, the methodologies employed, the discount rate, the
rehabilitation costs, labor protection costs, consideration of timing and
ICC conditions, possible acquisition of terminals and passenger lines by
public bodies, especially with regard to Central of New Jersey, and
proffers of freight lines at capitalized earnings. The opinion is loaded
with statistics, experts' estimates, and railroad terminology. Somehow
or other, we attempted to provide an answer to every question relating
to the valuation of the conveyed properties for continued rail use. The
opinion contains a valuable summary of the five pretrial orders that
laid out the paramaters of the trial and set the schedules for submission
statements and briefs.
42
In the Rail Use Opinion we deferred the questions concerning the
valuation of railroads that would be continued in rail use despite lack
of earning power or with earning power but without the prospect of
competitive bidding. We deferred such questions to a second or non-rail
use phase of the proceeding and referred to the values to be determined
in the second phases simply as X. Broadly speaking, X is the value that
could be obtained by sale for the next most valuable use, that is, a
break-up of the railroad and sale of its component parts. For most, but
not all purposes, X is "scrap value."
When we initiated this phase of the proceedings, it appeared that
42 In re Valuation Proceedings Under §§ 303(c) and 306 of the Regional Rail




a number of railroads would be involved.4 By the time of the argu-
ment, however, only Central Railroad of New Jersey (now Central
Jersey Industries, Inc. (CNJ)) and Lehigh & New England Railway"'
were involved; all of the other railroads had settled. In our Rail Use
Opinion we had found that despite CNJ's lack of earning power, in the
absence of the Rail Act, New Jersey would have bought all of CNJ's
conveyed properties.45 In its brief and argument CNJ presented two
theories. The first, the "perception theory," better described as the
"constructive offer" theory, attempted to construct what would have
happened in the real world if there had been no Rail Act. The second
theory was the scrap value model. The estimates of value produced by
CNJ differed widely from those of the government. We concluded that
CNJ had not met its burden of showing by clear and convincing evi-
dence that New Jersey would have made an offer at any ascertainable
figure. We then examined every alleged element of value, from cabooses
and roadway small tools to winddown costs, and came up with conclu-
sions leading to a figure less than CNJ and Lehigh and New England
wanted and more than the government wanted to pay.
The valuation proceedings are over. At this point our clerk of
court has 245,000 pages in files covering 187 linear feet. Each judge's
office has many feet of shelving occupied by railroad files. The govern-
ment, however, has a viable railroad in the northeast and midwest re-
gions of the country, one that now is the subject of competitive bidding.
I hope some day to pick up a law review and find an article dis-
cussing the methods and procedures the Special Railroad Court em-
ployed to handle the massive litigation generated by the creation of
Conrail. All of the testimony was in writing with cross-examination by
deposition. This avoided the use of a number of special masters, who
would have complicated the valuation process. This also permitted the
parties to make their own agreements on how the discovery process
should be handled and to conduct as many as half a dozen cross-exami-
nations simultaneously. A series of pretrial orders, preceded by state-
ments from the parties on the issues and by hearings on the proposed
orders, enabled the court to sharpen the contentions of the parties and
to clarify and narrow the issues. Briefs were exchanged simultaneously
without prejudice to any party, because the positions of the parties
The 1981 opinion is characterized by the parties as the Rail Use Opinion, and
it was contemplated there would be a Non-Rail Use Opinion. Instead, the opinion that
was written is referred to as the CNJ Opinion.
" Lehigh and New England was operated for a number of years as part of the
CNJ system. It relied virtually exclusively on CNJ's arguments in the rail litigation.
" In re Valuation Proceedings Under §§ 303(c) and 306 of the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973, 531 F. Supp. 1191, 1379 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1981).
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were well known. The court worked closely with the Liaison Commit-
tee. This is a sketchy oversimplification with serious omissions of pro-
cedures that were effective in an unusually complex proceeding. The
key to the court's success was not in procedures but in the personality
of the presiding judge. I use the word "personality" in the sense that
Eugen Erlich used it: "There is no guaranty of justice except the per-
sonality of the judge."
'4 6
It is unnecessary to discuss the Staggers Act4 7 and NERSA,4" both
of which amended the Rail Act, except to note that NERSA authorized
the assignment of additional judges to the Special Court.49 The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assigned Judges Oliver Gosch, Wil-
liam B. Bryant, and Charles R. Weinger, who function as a separate
panel (the section 1152 Panel of the court). Because NERSA made
important changes in the Act, especially with regard to labor, the sec-
tion 1152 Panel will relieve the original members of the court of a
substantial portion of the burden they would otherwise carry."
In sum, Henry Friendly's performance as Presiding Judge of the
46 Erlich, Judicial Freedom of Decision, in ScIaNCE OF LEGAL METHOD 9 MOD-
ERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 65 (1917).
41 Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 45, and 49 U.S.C.).
48 Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified
in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.).
41 45 U.S.C. § 1105(d) (1982).
11 The Special Court amended its rules to provide for a second panel, the § 1152
Panel. The Court noted:
This Court's understanding of § 1152(d) is that the three additional
judges (hereafter the § 1152 Panel) are empowered only to exercise the
jurisdiction described in § 1152(a), and that the judges previously desig-
nated (and their successors) are empowered (1) to exercise exclusively all
other jurisdiction of this Court, and (2) to participate, to such extent as the
§ 1152 Panel may desire and as they may be willing, in the exercise of the
jurisdiction described in § 1152(a).
Section 1152(a) provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the special court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action-
(1) or injunctive, declaratory, or other relief relating to the enforce-
ment, operation, execution, or interpretation of any provision of or amend-
ment made by this subtitle, or administrative action taken thereunder to
the extent such action is subject to judicial review;
(2) challenging the constitutionality of any provision of or amend-
ment made by this subtitle;
(3) to obtain, inspect, copy, or review any document in the possession
or control of the Secretary, Conrail, the United States Railway Associa-
tion, or Amtrak that would be discoverable in litigation under any provi-
sion of or amendment made by this subtitle; or
(4) seeking judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded upon the Constitution and resulting from the operation of any
provision or amendment made by this subtitle.
[Vol. 133:1
1984] HENRY FRIENDLY 77
Special Railroad Court demonstrates that he is unsurpassed as a
judge-in the power of his reasoning, the depth of his knowledge of the
law, and his balanced judgment in decisionmaking. Karl Llewellyn
would have been happy about that performance.

